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Abstract—The increasing number of attacks against automa-
tion systems such as SCADA and their network infrastructure
have demonstrated that there is a need to secure those systems.
Unfortunately, directly applying existing ICT security mecha-
nisms to automation systems is hard due to constraints of the
latter, such as availability requirements or limitations of the
hardware. Thus, the solution privileged by researchers is the
use of network-based intrusion detection systems (N-IDS).
One of the issue that many researchers encounter is how
to validate and evaluate their N-IDS. Having access to a real
and large automation systems for experimentation is almost
impossible as companies are not inclined to give access to their
systems due to obvious concerns. The few public traffic datasets
that could be used for off-line experiments are either synthetic
or collected at small testbeds. In this paper, we will describe
and characterize a public traffic dataset collected at the HVAC
management system of a university campus.
Although the dataset contains only packet headers, we believe
that it can help researchers, in particular designers of flow-based
IDS, to validate their solutions under more realistic conditions.
The traces can be found on https://github.com/gkabasele/HVAC_
Traces.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Industrial control and automation systems, such as SCADA,
have constraints different from traditional enterprise IT sys-
tems, especially with regard to availability. For example, some
end hosts, such as field device, have to operate continuously
for several decades without being stopped. It is also not un-
common to see SCADA systems using outdated hardware and
software as updating and patching is difficult and expensive.
For this reason, network-based Intrusion Detection Systems
(N-IDS) have been the privileged solution by researchers to
secure SCADA systems [6] [4] since, in contrast to host-
based IDS, they do not require modifications nor regular
updates on the hosts. Among techniques for network-based
intrusion detection, flow-based methods have been employed
by researchers for several years to build IDS for the Internet
[11] and also specifically for SCADA systems [8], [9], [22].
One of the problems that researchers are facing is how to
evaluate and validate their IDS solution. Getting access to real
control and automation systems is hard because their owners
are, for obvious reasons, rarely open to the idea of running
experiments in them. For this reason, most researchers rely
either on experiments in testbeds or simulated environments
or use traffic traces collected in such environments for off-line
experiments [1], [10], [17]. The advantage of these approaches
is the reproducibility of the experiments, the flexibility to test
different configurations, and the fact that no real system is
put in danger. However, it requires that the used environments
and traces accurately reflect the behavior of a real system,
which is challenging to ensure. Publications relying on data
from real systems for validation are much rarer and those that
exist have not published their datasets [8], [22], which makes
it impossible to reproduce them by other researchers. To our
knowledge, no public dataset from a real SCADA system or
any other type of automation system exists so far.
In this paper, we present and describe a public Building
Management System (BMS) dataset collected from part of the
Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning system (HVAC) of
a university campus. A BMS is a type of automation system
like SCADA. The dataset contains the headers of the network
packets exchanged between field devices, control servers and
human machine interfaces (HMI) of the BMS. The dataset
does not contain the payload of the packets due to privacy
and security reasons, but it can be used for purposes where
traffic traces on packet header level or flow level are needed,
such as
• flow-level traffic characterization,
• parametrization of traffic models for synthetic traffic
generation,
• experimentation with realistic background traffic load.
To the best of our knowledge, the dataset only contains
benign traffic. This means that the traces cannot be directly
used to validate flow-based intrusion detection systems due
to the absence of attacks (unless the goal is to evaluate
false positives). However, researchers can combine them with
malicious traffic or use them to generate synthetic traffic, as
indicated above.
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section II describes
the system from which the trace has been collected. Section III
explains the methodology used to collect the trace. Section IV
presents important traffic characteristics and findings, followed
by a discussion in Section V. Finally, the paper concludes in
Section VI.
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II. DESCRIPTION
In this section we describe the BMS from which the trace
has been collected. Due to privacy and security reasons, we
will not publish certain details, such as the deployed control
software, information related to non-BMS services, or the
physical configuration of the communication infrastructure.
A. HVAC Management System
The trace contains the network communication of a HVAC
management system. The system has been deployed by and is
managed by Honeywell.
The system is fully automated, with a server communicating
with peripheral devices deployed on the campus to control
heating in offices, classrooms, and lecture halls. The part of
the system that we have monitored controls around 15 to 20
buildings. It has been optimized for energy efficiency: When
a teacher books a classroom or lecture hall via the booking
application, a message is sent to the main server so that it
can instruct the PLC or RTU responsible for that room to
activate the heating several minutes before people are coming
in. Operators access the system through the Human Machine
Interface (HMI), which consists of dedicated workstations with
a graphical user interface, to see in real-time the current system
state or to set temperature goals manually.
B. System overview
The BMS, topology-wise, follows a typical design for
automation systems [12]. A communication network intercon-
nects the control server, the HMI stations, and the peripheral
devices. The sensors and actuators are attached to the latter.
Therefore, the peripheral devices are similar to PLCs and
RTUs in SCADA systems: They collect and send sensor data
to the server and their behavior can be (manually) influenced
from the HMIs, but most of the time they execute simple
control programs with setpoints defined by the server. The
network is isolated from the rest of the campus network. The
communication protocols are proprietary and use TCP/IP as
transport layer.
It is important to note that the peripheral devices are not
directly connected to the network. Instead, a group of devices
is connected to a gateway which acts as an end point for the
TCP connection from the control server (Figure 1). This allows
to also use devices which are not IP-capable. In the part of
the network that we consider for our dataset there are 8 such
gateways, each one connected to 1 to 15 peripheral devices.
III. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe the methodology we used to
collect the BMS traffic as well as the post processing applied
to obtain the dataset.
A. Packet collection
In order to collect all network communication in the BMS
network, we capture packets at two routers via port mirroring.
The usage of two vantage points is necessary because the paths
between the server and the peripheral devices are asymmetric.
Network
System part monitored
HMI Control Server
Gateway
Peripheral devices
Sensors and actuators
Figure 1: Network overview
We use tcpdump to capture the packets. For each packet,
tcpdump records a timestamp of when the packet was captured
based on the clock of the capturing device. Since we use two
devices, we synchronize their clocks with NTP so that packets
appear later in the correct order when merging the individ-
ual packet traces based on the timestamps. Unfortunately, it
showed in our first test runs that this clock synchronization is
not sufficient and time shifts ranging from 3ms to 10ms can
be observed, resulting in wrong packet orders.
To obtain a more accurate timing, we periodically compute
the shift between the two clocks and correct the recorded
timestamps accordingly when merging the traces. To this end,
capture device A sends every second an ICMP echo request
to device B which will reply with an ICMP echo reply. These
ICMP packets appear in the traces of both devices. The current
time shift s between the two clocks is then estimated by
s = tB − tA −RTT/2
where ti is the timestamp of the ICMP echo request as seen by
device i. The round-trip time RTT between the two devices
is estimated as RTT = t′A − tA where t′A is the timestamp
of the ICMP echo reply as seen by device A. Computing the
network delay between the two devices in this way assumes
that the delay is identical in both directions.
Using this approach, the number of out-of-order packets in
a trace of one hour duration can be reduced from 8500 to 85.
By increasing the frequency of the ICMP packets, we could
further decrease this number but we do not want to send too
many packets and add artificial load to the network.
B. Merging and anonymization process
When merging the packet traces from the two capture
devices, we calculate for every ICMP echo request the time
shift s using the method described above. We then adjust
the timestamps of all packets captured by device A in the
second following the ICMP request, i.e. the period of time
until the next ICMP request. At the end, we obtain merged
and time-corrected traces containing the packets captured by
the two devices. In a filtering step, we only keep packets that
either originate from or are destined to an host being part of
the HVAC system, typically the control server, an HMI, or a
gateway. We remove packets from protocols that are purely
related to network management, namely ARP, STP, VRRP,
LLMR. The original traces also contain SNMP traffic sent
by the workstations to several devices inside and outside the
network. Unfortunately, only the SNMP requests are visible to
our capture devices so we remove them. We publish the trace
in form of pcap files where each pcap file contains one hour
of traffic.
The owner of the BMS has demanded that the dataset is
anonymized before publication. To do so, several steps were
taken. First, we use the CryptoPan tool [13] to anonymize
the IP addresses in a prefix-preserving manner. This tool
uses cryptographic techniques and has the advantage of being
consistent across several files given that the same key is used
for the anonymization. We then truncate the packet payload
to only keep the headers and zero out the Organizationally
Unique Identifier (OUI) of the MAC address.
C. Ethical considerations
Before publishing the traces, we discussed with the parties
that would be affected by having the traces publicly available,
following the advices in [5]. These parties included the Chief
Information Security Officer of the university the dataset was
collected at and Honeywell, the company who deployed the
HVAC system and who are the manufacturers of the devices
and the authors of the protocols used by them. We got their
agreement after we explained what we wanted to publish and
why.
During the processing of the traces, we made sure that no
personal data was collected and that the traces can not be used
to infer the behavior of individual people. The dataset only
contains network traffic generated automatically, meaning that
it is not the direct result of human action, except for some part
of the communication between the HMI workstations and the
control server.
IV. TRAFFIC CHARACTERISTICS
This section presents the main characteristics of the col-
lected traces. We will discuss some of these characteristics in
terms of unidirectional flows. We define a flow using the usual
five-tuple (source IP address, destination IP address, source
port, destination port, transport protocol). When we refer to
flow size or packet size in the following, we always mean
the size of the payload, excluding headers. For TCP flows,
we only consider the ones where at least one byte of payload
was exchanged, thus removing connections which failed to be
established. Note that our flow definition ignores TCP flags
(SYN, FIN etc.), i.e. a flow more or less corresponds to the
definition of a flow record in Netflow/IPFIX [7] with active
and inactive timeout set to infinity.
A. Overview
We collected the traces over a period of one week (7 days)
in order to capture the behavior of the BMS on weekdays
as well as during the weekend. The capture started a Friday
afternoon at approximately 2PM. Table I shows a summary
of the part of the HVAC system we have monitored. The
right three columns give basic statistics of the bidirectional
communication between HMI↔server and server↔gateways,
respectively. The peripheral devices are not IP-capable, so we
could not capture the traffic between them and the gateways.
Host Type Number Communicate Payload Nbr pkts
with exchanged exchanged
HMI stations 7 Control Server 6.7GB 24.7M
Control Server 1 Gateways 387.7MB 11M
Gateways 8 Periph. devices – –
Periph. devices 58 – – –
Table I: HVAC summary
In total, we collected 11.2 GB of packet data (corresponding
to 4GB of packet headers) from 47 IP addresses and approx-
imately 23,000 flows. Table II shows some characteristics of
the entire dataset and the flows. As expected of automation
network, flows are small, the largest one transported 614.7
MBytes over one week.
dataset flows
bytes packets
size 11.2GB min 5B 1
duration 7 days avg 342.2kB 1725.08
Nbr flows 23K max 614.7MB 5.1M
Nbr IP 47
Table II: Trace Summary
Figure 2 shows the empirical CDF of (a) the number of
packets per flows, (b) the number of bytes per flow, and (c)
the flow duration. The CDFs show that there is a significant
number of flows with a very long duration and a large number
of packets, although the distribution of the number of bytes
per flow is rather conservative. Such a behavior is typical
for automation systems where the server and the peripheral
devices periodically exchange small control packets through
more or less permanent TCP connections. In fact, all those
connections in our trace lasted over the entire measurement
period.
B. Application protocols
Most of the observed traffic is from communication between
the HMI stations and the control server. The HMI stations
and the control server communicate through several port.
First, they exchange Remote Procedure Calls for Distributed
Computing Environment (DCE/RPC) packet [15]. The control
server acts as the DCE/RPC server on port 135. Surprisingly,
an inspection of the packets revealed that other ports were used
as well to exchange DCE/RPC packets. Those ports were not
fixed; they changed during the duration of the capture. The
protocol used for the communication between the server and
the gateways is proprietary (port 2499).
In addition to the protocols used between the different
components of the HVAC system, we observed other proto-
cols. These protocols include ones from the NetBIOS family
(NBDS, NBNS, NBSS) and are used by the HMI workstations
and the control server to exchange data with each other and
discover available services in the network.
We also observed some S7 communication, a protocol used
by Siemens PLCs. This traffic was related to another part of
the BMS but we kept it in the dataset as it demonstrates an
example of heterogeneity in automation systems. Web traffic
was also observed, we discuss it in Section IV-E.
C. Network activity time series
As mentioned in Section II-A, the peripheral devices are
connected to the IP network through gateways. The various
devices differ in age and capabilities and therefore depict
different communication characteristics. We illustrate this in
the following with two gateways X and Y which connect 11,
resp. 13, peripheral devices. In the part of the BMS monitored
by us, 6 gateways have the same profile as gateway X and 2
gateways are similar to gateway Y , but with different numbers
of peripheral devices connected to them.
We plot the time series of the number of packets and number
of bytes exchanged per hour between the main server and the
gateways. Figures 3a and 3b (resp. 4a and 4b) show these
plots for gateway X (resp. Y ). We note some differences
between the two gateways. First, despite having a comparable
number of devices attached to them, the number of packets
observed at gateway Y is considerably higher than at gateway
X . A similar observation can be made for the number of
exchanged bytes. We also notice how differently the packets
are generated in both directions. In gateway X , the number of
packets sent to the server is close to the number of packet sent
in the other direction. In fact, most of the packets sent by the
server to gateway X are ACK segments. We can see that the
server behaves differently in the case of gateway Y : It actively
sends segments with control commands to the gateway. Since
the gateways are connected to devices of different models, it
means that the devices connected at gateway Y are more data
intensive.
Finally, we observe diurnal and weekly patterns in the
timeseries. The measurement was started on a Friday at
around 2PM, therefore the first 55 hours of low activity in
the timeseries correspond to the weekend. This behavior is
understandable when considering the nature of the physical
processes controlled by the BMS, but it should be noted that
not all automation systems behave necessarily like this [2].
Interestingly, gateway Y shows lower activity during the night
than during the weekend although the buildings are not used in
both situations. Our assumption is that there is a kind of sleep
mode enabled during the night which decreases the frequency
at which data are exchanged.
D. Packet size distribution
SCADA network protocols such as Modbus/TCP [19] or
DNP3 require that the payload fits in a single IP packet
to avoid packet fragmentation. These protocols aim at low
latencies or even real-time usage, so packet fragmentation is
undesired. We study the packet sizes of for the entirety of the
packets sent from both gateways to the server. The gateway
X sent 255,251 packets and the gateway Y sent 5,183,021
packets. Figure 3c and 4c show the normalized histograms of
the observed packet payload sizes in bytes for each gateway.
Similar to SCADA systems, the packet sizes are rather small
in both cases — they do not exceed 170 bytes. Moreover,
only a few different sizes can be observed. Similar to other
characteristic, there is a difference between the two gateways.
Most of the packet sent by the gateway X contain actual
data and there is only a small percentage (approx. 20%) of
empty ACK while gateway Y sends more that 2 million empty
packets.
E. Flow stability
When comparing traditional ICT networks and automation
networks, it is a commonly accepted fact that the latter are
more stable in term of traffic activities, such as the number of
TCP connections established. This is also mostly true for the
BMS network studied in this paper.
We show in Figure 5 the number of new flows discovered
per hour. For this figure, we have counted flows directly related
to the HVAC system, i.e. flows between the control server,
the HMI workstations and the gateways, separately from other
UDP and TCP flows. As it can be seen in the figure, except for
the first hour when we start the capture, the number of flows
discovered for the HVAC system is mostly constant. Actually,
flows from the gateway to the control server lasted for the
whole duration of the capture and there were no new flow
created. The peaks that can be seen on the HVAC result from
the change of the port used by the control server for DCE/RPC.
The number of TCP flows discovered usually does not exceed
500 except at some point where we can see high peak. The
TCP and UDP flow, apart form the HVAC system, are mostly
HTTP/HTTPS and DNS flows created when the HMI stations
check if there are new updates. The peaks are caused by actual
software updates that took place during the measurement
period. We have deliberately kept these "anomalies" in the
dataset as they illustrate that even stable BMS systems can
show irregular traffic patterns which might confuse intrusion
detection systems.
V. DISCUSSION AND RELATED WORK
The characteristics of network traffic in industrial con-
trol and automation systems have been discussed in several
(a) CDF of the number of packets per flow (b) CDF of the number of bytes (in kBytes) per
flow
(c) CDF of the flow duration (in hours)
Figure 2: Flow characteristics
(a) Packets per hour (b) KBytes per hour (c) Packet size distribution
Figure 3: Traffic observed at gateway X
(a) Packets per hour (b) KBytes per hour (c) Packet size distribution
Figure 4: Traffic observed at gateway Y
publications. The SCADA network traffic of different utility
companies is studied in [2], [3]. In [8] and [22], the authors
analyze the network traffic of BACnet-based BMS. To our
knowledge, none of the datasets used in those and similar
publications is publicly available due to privacy and security
concerns. Therefore, researchers without access to a real
system have to rely on public datasets collected in testbeds and
virtual environments [1], [17] or setup their own infrastructure
for experiments, for example in [18].
As explained, our dataset does not contain payload data nor
malicious traffic. Nevertheless, it can be used in research on
flow-based network intrusion detection systems that do not
rely on deep packet analysis. With tools like tcpreplay [16],
researcher can replay the traces to obtain (benign) traffic that
can be mixed with synthetic attack traffic for their experiments.
Moreover, the traces contain valuable packet-level information
for anomaly-based intrusion detection [14], such as the time-
stamp and size of each packet. This data allows to study the
dynamic of the HVAC flows which is useful to create a model
of the system.
The traces can also serve as a basis for trace generation. As
mentioned earlier, researchers experiment on traces collected
from simulated environments or testbeds since they do no
have access to real systems. To be of relevance, the simulated
environments must behave as close as possible to a real
systems, which is hard to ensure. We believe that the traces
Figure 5: Flows seen per hour
can help to improve the accuracy of simulated environments.
There is some work on how to generate synthetic traces
from another one [20], [21]. It relies on statistical models
and machine learning techniques to generate traces that have
similar properties to the one they were generate from. We will
also work in that direction as future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
Doing research on industrial control and automation systems
security is challenging because researchers usually do not have
access to real systems for experimentation and existing public
datasets for off-line experimentation are rare and stemming
from testbeds or simulated environments.
In this paper, we present a public BMS network trace
collected from the HVAC management system of a university
campus. We show that the trace depicts the common character-
istics of automation systems, such as long lived connections,
but also follows a diurnal pattern similar to those caused by
human activities in traditional IT networks.
To our knowledge, this is the first public trace from a
real BMS. The traces can be found on https://github.com/
gkabasele/HVAC_Traces.
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